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Abstract  
In this paper critical realism is suggested as a 
suitable philosophical assumption to guide a 
separate, stand-alone retrospective evaluation of 
design science projects and artifacts. A main 
contribution of the paper is to argue that knowledge 
can be gained in retrospective evaluations of design 
science projects regardless of the success or non-
success of the project itself. Thereby, retrospective 
evaluation complements current evaluations that are 
mostly means-end focused. The argumentation is 
supported through re-visiting two e-government 
design science projects, which can be considered 
both as failures and successes depending on the 
framing. Critical realism puts focus on knowing 
through making and widens the use of design science 
in areas where utility is not the main goal. Future 
research should focus on providing more details on 
how a critical realism retrospective in design science 
should be carried out. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The aim of design science research (DSR) is to 
extend the boundaries of human and organizational 
capabilities by creating new and innovative artifacts; 
thus, the goal of design science is utility [1], [2]. This 
paper argues that in order to reach the aim of 
extending boundaries and capabilities in modern 
organizations, the goal of DSR should be more 
extensive; thus, DSR evaluation should be based on a 
wider range of goals than utility. Furthermore, [3] 
makes a call for future research that “illustrates the 
benefits of appropriate reflection in the context of 
past or ongoing DSR projects in greater detail” [3, p. 
165]. Retrospective evaluation in and of DSR is 
therefore suggested and discussed in this paper.  
Retrospective evaluation can be carried out both 
during and after finishing a DSR project, as a stand-
alone effort. Furthermore, design science researchers 
should be self-critical in a retrospective where the 
researcher critically examines the design process and 
the developed artifact(s). Critical realism (CR) is 
proposed as a suitable philosophical assumption to 
guide retrospective evaluation in DSR. Thereby, this 
research follows [4]–[6], who argue for moving 
beyond the limited positivistic notion of the DSR 
originator [7] by adopting a CR philosophy [8]. 
Furthermore, aligning DSR with CR highlights both 
rigor and relevance, including the promotion of 
emancipatory change, and provides a suitable basis 
for attempting to develop a more integrated and 
coherent body of theory and research [5]. 
Emancipatory elements in critical realism can thereby 
facilitate ethical and normative awareness in design 
science in line with what [9] suggests as suitable for 
information systems (IS) research.  
The aim with CR retrospective is to improve the 
understanding of consequences of choices made and 
actions taken, and thereby, enrich the knowing 
through making process of DSR. By adopting CR as 
a philosophical basis the author envision DSR to 
become the methodological choice in research when 
the knowing though making is fundamental but the 
goal is not primarily on achieving utility. Adopting 
CR thereby makes design science more suitable in 
some areas of research such as e-government. Design 
science is considered valuable for e-government; 
however, existing frameworks for design science do 
not provide specific guidance on how to apply DSR 
in an e-government context [10]. Following this line 
of thought, the argumentation made in this paper is 
illustrated and supported by re-visiting two e-
government DSR projects where success and failure 
differ depending on the framing.  
This research thereby complements and extends 
existing work on DSR since (i) it explicates that DSR 
can have different and/or complementary goals in 
parallel with the traditional utility goal advocated by 
e.g. [1], [2].  (ii) Retrospective evaluation can extend 
and be used in parallel to any of the existing DSR 
methodologies such as [1], [2], [11]–[13]. (iii) It 
encourages putting more focus on evaluation of DSR 
research projects as a stand-alone research endeavor 
and argues that valuable knowledge can be gained 
regardless of the success or non-success of a DSR 
project. By advocating critical realism as an explicit 
4675
Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41732
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND
underlying philosophical assumption, this research 
also addresses the need expressed by [14] to explicate 
underlying beliefs and assumptions when doing DSR. 
By focusing on providing a philosophical basis 
for stand-alone evaluation of DSR projects and 
artifacts, this paper differs from other researchers 
who relate CR to DSR by suggesting a separate 
methodology based on CR [15], and from researchers 
focusing on DSR only as a philosophy beneficial to 
combine with CR philosophy without mentioning any 
DSR method or suggesting how this should be done 
[4]–[6]. All these authors also leave emancipatory 
and critical elements of CR out of their scope, 
although they mention their importance.  
This article is structured accordingly: after the 
introduction, related work on design science is 
presented and CR is further explained. Then design 
science evaluation is discussed followed by the re-
visitation of the two illustrative e-government cases. 
The article ends with a discussion and conclusions 
and suggestions for future research.   
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Design Science Knowledge 
 
Design science is the science of the artificial and 
has its roots in engineering and science of the 
artificial [7]. Two of the most important works that 
has defined design science research are [1] and [2]. 
The aim of design science as described by these 
authors is to change reality and make it better through 
the design of Information Technology (IT) artifacts 
such as constructs, models, methods, and 
instantiations [1]. Another important outcome from 
design science is knowledge, such as design theories 
[16] and abstractions that can be used in designing 
and implementing IS initiatives [15].  
More recently, a research stream that has a 
broader focus and addresses IS artifacts as socio-
technical systems instead of only considering IT 
artifacts has emerged [15]. Socio-technical DSR 
differs from traditional DSR since it is more firmly 
embedded in the context where it is developed [15]. 
Although it can be argued that socio-technical DSR 
differs from traditional IS, they share the focus of 
knowing though making and the focus on change. 
The research processes suggested for both are also 
similar, although the focus on artifact output (e.g. [1], 
[2]) or theory output (e.g. [11], [12]) differs. DSR is 
thereby regarded as relying on an iterative process 
that contains three main parts: defining or finding a 
problem to solve, designing an IT/IS artifact that 
solve the problem, and evaluation to prove that the 
artifact did in fact improve status quo (e.g. [7], [1], 
[2], [11], [13], [17]). The evaluation should be judged 
by the utility of the artifact [1], [2]. 
The need to produce knowledge (i.e. design 
theories) during the design and evaluation activities is 
also an important part of design science (e.g. [11], 
[12], [15]) The knowledge production of DSR has 
been articulated as knowledge of how to achieve 
desired ends or prescriptive knowledge [1], [16], 
[18], [19]. In [19] Gregor compares design theories 
with recipes and states that following a provisioned 
recipe will cause an artifact of a certain type to come 
into existence.  
In [20] the prescriptive knowledge sought in 
design science is considered problematic from the 
perspective of management studies. The authors 
argue that design science is beneficial and relevant 
for management research “if it stands for 
investigating the complex nature of a design process 
in which ‘designers’ creatively use resources and 
engage with evolutionary patterns in order to reshape 
environmental constraints and create novel artifacts” 
[20, p. 183]. When design science is applied as 
prescriptive research, different from explanatory 
social research, the application of design science for 
management is considered very limited and not as 
fruitful for generating understanding [20]. 
In human-computer interaction, [21] also see 
weaknesses in prescriptive knowledge especially in 
the form of methods, and propose meals and 
ingredients rather than recipes as an analogy to argue 
for their standpoint. Applying this analogy on DSR 
would imply that apart from prescriptive design 
knowledge (the recipe), what has made up the 
recipe—the ingredients (e.g. the people working in 
the project, the context, people touched by the 
artifact, external factors affecting it, etc.) and how it 
was cooked (the process leading to the developed 
artifact and choices made)—needs to be understood 
to make the recipe understandable and thereby 
usable. The views expressed by [20], [21] thereby—
to some extent—oppose the work by [19] on theory 
in IS. 
 
2.2 Critical Realism  
 
Philosophical assumptions are the basics for 
scientific paradigms, which are important because 
they legitimize how knowledge may be created and 
what constitutes valid knowledge [22]. Critical 
realism as a philosophical assumption was introduced 
by [8] and can be seen as an alternative to the most 
prominent research paradigms in information 
systems, i.e. of positivism and interpretivism [23].  
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 According to [24], three aspects can distinguish a 
research paradigm: ontology, epistemology and 
methodology.  It can be argued that a fourth aspect, 
i.e. axiology, should also be considered in research 
paradigms that concern inquiry [25]. Axiology 
concerns the nature of value and the value question of 
what is intrinsically worthwhile [25]. Regarding these 
four aspects, ontology is the most important concept 
in critical realism and also the importance of 
separating ontology from epistemology.  Critical 
realism ontology argues that a real world exists, apart 
from our human experience and knowledge, i.e. 
realism ontology. Opposed to positivism, critical 
realism, however, states that human understanding 
and knowledge of the real world are socially 
constructed and fallible, thereby adopting a more 
interpretive epistemology [26]. Critical realism also 
contains an emancipatory axiology often associated 
with a critical research paradigm, e.g. [27]. 
According to [23], critical realism “offers exciting 
prospects in shifting attention to the real problems 
that we face and their underlying causes, and away 
from a focus on data and methods of analysis” [23, p. 
795]. In regards to methodology, critical realism 
favors using a variety of methods to identify 
underlying mechanisms of observed events [26].  
The basic theoretical building blocks for critical 
realism are objects (entities) and the external and 
visible behavior of people, systems, and things as 
they occur, or as they have happened. Another key 
aspect in critical realism is retroduction [28], and the 
question asked is, “What must be true in order to 
make this event possible?” A closely related concept 
is abduction, which advocates the observation of 
phenomena through theory to derive explanatory 
theory about the phenomena [26]. Critical realism is 
thereby “a powerful tool in understanding the 
interplay of structure and agency in design activity 
dependence, and in theorizing generative 
mechanisms, well suited to theorize aspirations to a 
more humane and equal society” [5, p. 606].  
Another important part of critical realism is the 
notion of different domains in the world that is the 
real, the actual and the empirical [8], and the 
accompanying levels, i.e. mechanisms, event and 
experiences [29]. Mechanisms cause events in the 
actual domains, which in turn become experiences in 
the empirical domain [30]. Outcomes thereby arise 
from the multifaceted relationship between powers, 
structures, and predispositions that create generative 
mechanisms [31]. As humans we can experience 
outcomes in the empirical domain, whereas the event 
is actually happening in the real domain and is caused 
by mechanisms operating in the actual domain [26]. 
Since human experience is limited to outcomes 
located in the empirical domain, they are always open 
to different interpretations. Thereby, observations are 
always fallible, the understanding of social situations 
remains incomplete, and there can be no definite 
criteria to judge the truth of explanations [26]. In 
order to find the best or most suitable approximation 
of truth, critical realism trusts the researcher to 
accumulate data that facilitate differentiation among 
alternative explanations, and the research community 
to debate them thoroughly [26]. Critical realism 
differs in this aspect from established paradigms, for 
example positivism, where domains and layers are 
flattened, implying that a single empirical experience 
gives direct access to outcomes, including those that 
certainly arise in the real and actual domains, and in 
the events and mechanisms layers [28].  
CR thereby offers a perspective upon which to 
base reflective and critical analysis. The 
methodological support in CR is, however, 
considered limited and needs more investigation. 
Examples of research that suggests methodological 
guidelines for doing CR research in IS are [32] for 
data analysis and [33] for case study research. Also, 
[34] discusses implications of CR in mixed methods 
research. These authors do not, however, address CR 
in DS.  
 
3. Considering Evaluation in DSR 
 
Several authors have proposed methods for 
evaluating DSR artifacts (e.g. [35]; see also [36] for a 
comprehensive review of existing artifact evaluation 
methods). The scientific evaluation of DSR should 
include both the utility of the designed artifact, and 
the quality of the design science knowledge outcomes 
[35]. The evaluation of knowledge outcomes should, 
according to [35],  provide evidence that the theory is 
correct, i.e. leads to development of artifacts that 
solve problems or make an improvement. In regards 
to evaluation of the artifact as an output, [9, p. 85]  
writes, “A design artifact is complete and effective 
when it satisfies the requirements and constraints of 
the problem it was meant to solve,” this is articulated 
as the utility of the artifact. Thereby the most 
common evaluation type is a means-end-oriented 
evaluation [37], mostly interested in how effectively 
the artifact helps achieve the given goals or ends 
[37]. This is also the type suggested by [1], [2] and 
also [11], [13], [17] who state that the outcome of the 
DSR evaluation is a measure of how well the artifact 
solves the defined problem. The means-end-oriented 
types of DSR also have a epistemological standpoint 
of positivism [3] in common, although both 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies 
are allowed to evaluate the utility of the artifact.  
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The claim that most DSR research is positivistic 
is further supported by, for example [22], who see an 
implicit positivistic paradigm in both [38] and [1]. 
Consistent with a positivistic view, the preferred 
methods for evaluation in design science is, 
according to [1], quantitative methods such as 
computational and mathematical methods, although 
empirical methods are also allowed. 
Evaluation in general has also had a strong 
emphasis on positivistic measures of success [39]. 
Current evaluation outcomes are thereby considered 
restricted and their value less, due to the narrow 
ontological and epistemological foundations and 
because they only assess outcomes of interventions in 
the experience layer and empirical domain [39], [40]. 
Positivistic evaluations can thereby only provide a 
measure for comparing achievement against pre-
determined objectives (i.e. means-end) but fail to 
define the causal influences (mechanisms) that can 
generate the observed outcomes. Insights into 
plausible explanations of mechanisms and 
relationships behind an observed event occurring 
within an intervention such the implementation of a 
DSR artifact in a public organization remain implicit 
and unknown. Following the argumentation made by 
[39], [40] utility as a measure for success in DSR 
evaluation is considered limited. One example is that 
utility, as often used in DSR evaluation, only 
considers the capacity or usefulness [1] of the object 
and actively disregards the ability of the users and the 
organizational context as a “why” question to be 
solved by behavioral science [1]. Although the 
necessity of considering more aspects than the 
capacity of the artifact in isolation has been 
acknowledged [11], they remain uncommon in DSR.  
Utility in relation to DSR artifacts also constantly 
changes. Ten years ago, it was important to keep 
communication interfaces compressed and small, and 
even XML was considered too chatty due to the 
limited bandwidth; today, we easily stream motion 
pictures. When an evaluation is carried out also 
impacts the utility, for example, ex-ante (measuring 
the potential of an artifact) or ex-post (measuring the 
actual benefits). More recently, the need to address 
the limitations in the concept of utility has also been 
acknowledged (e.g. [3], [35], [41]). For instance, [41] 
suggests a fitness-utility model for evaluation in 
DSR; to accommodate utility in the future, the 
guiding philosophical assumption is, however, still 
positivistic and does not address the issues of 
extracting knowledge from failures or include values 
that fundamentally differ from utility.  
Basing the generation of knowledge only on 
success is, however, not the only way, and sometimes 
not even the most preferable one [42], [43].  In line 
with this traditional, evaluation methods have also 
been criticized by [42] since they only consider 
intended or expected outcomes and fail to detect 
outcomes or consequences that were not included in 
the logical framework or research hypothesis. In [42]  
risks are also identified when ignoring negative 
consequences that can affect the weak and vulnerable 
groups. Research programs thereby risk failing on 
equity objectives, allowing richer and more powerful 
groups to enjoy a disproportionate share of program 
benefits, while resulting in serious negative 
consequences for some groups—usually the poorest 
and most vulnerable [42]. Current IS design science 
discourse for socio-technical design projects do not, 
however, encourage, or even guide, researchers to 
prevent their artifacts from triggering negative 
consequences for society [3].  
Relating the argumentation made by [42], [43] to 
DSR would imply that the focus on defining a DSR 
problem that has a possible solution limits the scope 
of possible problems and also puts unsolvable 
problems out of scope for DSR. There is also a risk 
with the means-end-oriented evaluation that problems 
are simplified to make it possible to solve them, since 
the value of the research is defined as the solving of 
the specified problem. One example would be to limit 
the number of stakeholder perspectives since they 
often differ and thereby complicate the problem 
definition. This in turn could lead to excluding 
stakeholder groups with less influence, while letting 
strong stakeholder groups define the problem. There 
is also a risk of omitting the publication of design 
science failures or at least trying to hide such failures 
by only evaluating specific features that are expected 
to be successful. Support for the argumentation is 
found in [3], who state that current evaluation 
methods in DSR, including [1], [2], [16], [35],  can 
lead to limited perspectives and misleading ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluations of potential and real impacts 
of designed artifacts. Furthermore, [13] argues that 
innovation potential can be lost when the focus is 
only on problem-solving of pre-specified problems in 
DSR. It seems obvious that the process of knowing 
through making can be hindered by the need to prove 
the utility of the result, i.e. the developed artifacts. 
What if an artifact cannot be proven to deliver 
enough utility? Should the research process, and the 
knowing that was produced during the making of the 
artifact also be judged as not good?  
The goal of utility in DSR can also be related to 
how DSR research is evaluated by the research 
community, by using the notion of falsification as 
defined by Popper [44] as the demarcation line 
between science and pseudoscience. How do you 
judge whether an artifact provides better utility, or 
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functions better than any other artifact? According to 
[35] one possibility is to compare to other artifacts 
with a similar purpose. To do this in a real setting is, 
however, challenging. For instance, how should you 
define which artifacts to compare? How do you gain 
access to them? How do you eliminate variables such 
as marketing or country specific circumstances? Even 
if you manage to make a comparison, how do you 
define what and how to compare? It is also a risk that 
aspects for comparison are chosen based on the 
intention to prove the utility of the designed artifact.  
It is thereby difficult to provide a convincing 
argument or “proof,” while at the same time the 
possibility of falsification [44] is hampered since it is 
equally difficult to prove that the artifact does not 
provide utility, using the same arguments. The 
opportunity to disregard the outcome of design 
science research due to the lack of utility is thereby 
always present because objectively proving the utility 
of an artifact without doubt is not possible. Instead of 
providing universal truth, [45] states that the goal of 
evaluation is to identify what works for whom in 
what circumstances. To guide this work, an 
evaluation framework based on CR is presented 
where context and mechanisms lead to outcomes.  
This can be related to the food analogy where the 
meals and ingredients are part of what is behind (the 
mechanisms) of any recipe. Transferring the 
argumentation of [39], [40] and [45] to DSR, it can 
be argued that CR-guided DSR evaluation 
retrospectives provide the tool to generate 
understanding from DSR projects as advocated by 
[20], [21],  and also addresses the need for meals and 
ingredients, rather than recipes as expressed by [21].  
 
4. Retrospective  
 
To illustrate the value of a DSR retrospective, a 
re-visit to two DSR projects in an e-government 
context is made. Due to space limitation, a complete 
CR retroduction where underlying mechanisms are 
identified and elaborated to explain the findings was 
not, however, possible; but still, the re-visitation is 
considered to provide a foundation and motivation to 
the argumentation made in the paper since it 
visualizes the need to extend what is regarded as 
valuable in DSR. 
 
4.1. The Open Social E-service Project 
 
The first case is a three-year e-government project 
funded by the Swedish Governmental Agency for 
Innovation Systems, named Vinnova. Other 
publications within the project include [46]–[51]. The 
project, named “Open Social e-Services,” took place 
between 2009 and 2012 with an extension of 6 
months in 2012. The project involved representatives 
from the public sector, i.e. from one municipality, 
and IT vendors, as well as academics from the 
disciplines of information systems, social work, and 
law. The purpose of the project was to develop open 
social e-services to improve citizen services and 
decrease authoritative barriers to assisted living 
services. The result was a number of new e-services, 
i.e. artifacts for assisted living, such as emergency 
help telephones, part-time successors and 
companions. Citizens apply for services online, and if 
they meet predefined eligibility criteria, they receive 
immediate approval and can start using the service. 
Integration towards existing administrative systems 
as well as service providers ensured a digital and 
automated application process.  
Several types of evaluations were conducted 
during the project lifetime; examples are process 
verification tests, usability tests, and benefit analysis. 
The results of the evaluations show that most of the 
goals set for the project are being met [48]. Examples 
of measures that were evaluated and met are that the 
administrative work time can be reduced by 85% and 
the lead-time from application submission to decision 
received was reduced from seven working days to 
four minutes [49]. Business models for ensuring the 
afterlife of the artifacts were also developed.   
 
4.2. Revisiting the Open Social E-service Project 
 
A re-visitation of the project in 2014 showed that 
no other municipality had started to use the service, 
and the Swedish municipality where the project took 
place did not yet have well-functioning routines for 
handling the open social e-services; instead, a 
number of problems of getting the solution into use 
were still present to a large extent. At present (2016), 
the services have been taken down from the web page 
of the municipality and is thereby no longer in use. 
The main reason is said to be because no cases were 
submitted through the e-services. One explanation to 
why the service was not used is that the target group 
of elderly citizens did not have the ability to use the 
e-service since it required the user to, for instance, 
have an e-legitimation.  
The result of the project has, however, been 
successfully used for educational purposes by several 
researchers participating in the project. Examples 
include; teaching business process modeling, e-
government service design and examples of how IS 
artifacts can reduce time consuming tasks by 
automation. As a teaching resource the results from 
the project have thereby been highly valued.  
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Knowledge gained from the project include for 
instance the following: (i) the knowledge on how to 
legally automate positive decisions based on 
predefined criteria, (ii) an understanding of the time-
consuming tasks by employees at the municipality, 
(iii) understanding that IS can remove repetitive and 
simple tasks and instead facilitate professionalism for 
case handlers within the social service department. 
(iv) The understanding that several of the developed 
services were similar and could be carried out in a 
similar fashion. Other benefits include negotiation 
power towards IT-vendors and improved competence 
of procurement of IT services. From the non-existent 
usage, the knowledge of considering all stakeholder 
groups was also gained as well as the importance of 
the users. Most of the envisioned benefits were not 
realized, although initial evaluations indicated that 
effectiveness and efficiency could be greatly 
improved by using the designed artifacts. The re-
visitation does, however, also show that several other 
benefits (see examples above), not envisioned, have 
been attained. The values of these benefits are 
difficult to measure and were not part of the initial 
goals of the project, but they are still valuable. 
Regarding the project as a complete failure, therefore, 
provides an erroneous picture.  
The re-visitation also puts focus on the problem 
space and problem definition in conjunction with 
evaluation. If we regard the problem space as the 
problem of improving the present case handling 
routine, and the artifact only as an isolated IT artifact, 
then we can evaluate the capacity of the IT artifact to 
solve the problem without considering the context 
and excluding the stakeholders and we arrive at a 
high utility. If we instead consider the problem as 
that of improving the case handling process from 
start to end and the artifact as an IS artifact, we also 
have to evaluate all aspects including context and 
stakeholders. The result of such an evaluation instead 
yields almost zero utility.   
 
4.3. The Munizapp Project 
 
The second case is a research project set up in 
2010 and also funded by Vinnova. The goal of the 
project was to develop an m-government solution that 
enables citizen sourcing, and thereby facilitates 
collaboration between local governments and 
citizens. Other publications within the project include 
[52]–[56]. Two software development companies 
developed the artifact; one built a front-end app, and 
the other developed an e-platform and also 
integration towards case handling systems in 
municipalities. Eight municipalities in Sweden of 
different size and demography represented the user 
side of the municipal systems in the project. 
Reference groups representing citizens as users were 
also part of the project. Within the project, a business 
model for the continuation of the solution into a 
commercial phase was developed. The project ended 
in June 2013, and the solution is now commercialized 
through one of the SME partners that participated in 
the project.  
The solution was evaluated through experimental 
and testing evaluations. Controlled experiments, 
functional tests, and simulations were performed 
through iterative prototype testing by the project 
participants. Improvements were identified during the 
evaluations and fixed by the developing companies. 
In the evaluation of the final prototype version, 
thirty-five citizens tested the solution and then 
responded to a survey. Citizens demonstrated a 
positive attitude toward the solution. A number of 
citizens stated that they found the app intuitive and 
easy to use. Citizens also gave suggestions for 
improvements to the app. A theoretical evaluation of 
the solution [52] was performed using a citizen-
sourcing framework. The findings from the 
theoretical evaluation of the solution show that the 
solution includes functionalities supporting open 
government and citizen sourcing [52]. 
 
4.4. Revisiting the Munizapp Project 
 
A re-visitation in 2015 made through interviews 
with IT vendors, municipalities, and a web page 
survey showed that the app is offered by nine 
Swedish municipalities out of the total of 290 
municipalities in Sweden. Five of these 
municipalities are using a case handling system with 
integration towards the Munizapp artifact. These five 
have received several hundreds of reports made by 
their citizens. None of these five municipalities, 
however, participated in the design of the solution. 
The owner of Munizapp considers the adoption rate 
very low, but admits that no marketing efforts have 
been made to sell the solution to Swedish 
municipalities, except by the only IT-vendor selling a 
case handling system integrated with the solution. 
The Munizapp app was found to be the best with 
regard to ease of use as well as functionality. It was 
also the only app providing two-way communication 
between municipalities and citizens.  
The re-visitation of the project shows that 
artifacts can be considered as partly fulfilling the 
initial goals of the project. The artifact has been 
shown to enable citizen sourcing and collaboration, 
which is taking place but to a very limited extent. 
Several knowledge claims can, however, be made 
from the project. Examples include the need to 
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consider IT-vendors as an important stakeholder in 
citizen-sourcing, the difficulties in balancing 
government and citizens needs, and also the 
impossibility of designing for citizens as a 
homogenous group. Knowledge was also gained in 
risks associated with the solution, such as the 
exclusion of groups who do not own smartphones, 
privacy risks and information quality risks.  
 
4.5 Summary  
 
The re-visitation to the two e-government projects 
provides a scattered picture of the utility of the 
artifacts designed. The initial evaluations during 
testing and design show great potential for 
improvements both in regards to effectiveness and 
efficiency and also in regards to political goals of 
openness. Ex-post evaluations provide a different 
picture; most of the benefits envisioned at the 
beginning have not been realized at all by the 
developed artifacts, especially with regard to 
effectiveness and efficiency. It could, therefore, be 
argued that the artifacts have not addressed the 
identified problems.  
With regard to design science evaluations, this 
picture would suggest that the utility of the artifacts 
could not be proved, at least not continuously. It 
could, therefore, be argued that the artifacts do not 
yield utility, which in turn could be regarded as a 
failed design science effort [1]. According to CR, 
non-occurrences of expected events also should, 
however, be of interest and can be learned from [26]. 
As shown above, values other than effectiveness and 
efficiency, or even other than problem solving, have 
been realized. It can also be argued that problem 
solving, or rather problem-understanding, has been 
improved by the design efforts—in other words, 
knowing through making has taken place. It can also 
be seen that change has happened, although not the 
changed envisioned. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
According to [39] and [40], CR should 
complement existing evaluation approaches in 
evaluations that are “multi-faceted, mixed mode 
empirical methodology embracing pluralistic 
perspectives and multiple stakeholders” [40, p. 3]. 
This can be related to the socio-technical view of 
DSR, which according to [15], differs from 
traditional DSR. The reasons are that effects can be 
more difficult to isolate and evaluate, and knowledge 
is more deeply embedded in the context [15]. This 
also makes developing and evaluating the design 
knowledge a complex task [15].  
Compared to previous research in DSR where the 
focus remains on problem-solving (although to a 
varied extent), this research argues for a wider focus 
in DSR that also includes other values such as 
problem-understanding and ethics. I also argue, in 
line with [57], that prescriptions are not the only—
and perhaps not a sufficient theoretical outcome of 
socio-technical design science research. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that the problem can never be known 
beforehand, but is instead iteratively understood as 
the development of an artifact unfolds, similar to the 
reasoning by [11], [12]. By designing the problem 
beforehand and then performing evaluations that 
match the initial problem understanding, knowledge 
is reduced to recipes rather than meals and 
ingredients. To avoid focusing only on problem-
solving [13] suggests an agile design science 
methodology but does not include retrospectives that 
can be considered a very important part of any agile 
methodology to continuously, and after each project, 
get feedback, and learn from the experiences of 
different participants.  
To address the above-mentioned weaknesses in 
DSR while still acknowledging the value of current 
DSR methods is to perform CR-guided retrospective 
evaluation of both artifacts and DSR projects. This 
research thereby extends and complements the agile 
DSR method suggested by [13]. The CR-guided 
retrospective is especially considered beneficial for 
socio-technical DSR endeavors due to the arguments 
put forth by, e.g. [15]. The CR-guided retrospectives 
can be carried out in parallel and/or after the project 
is complete in order to both expand knowledge 
creation opportunities and to identify mistakes made 
to improve the research process—i.e. to do better 
next time. Transferring the argumentation of [39], 
[40] and [45] to DSR, it can be argued that CR-
guided DSR evaluation retrospectives provide the 
tool to generate understanding from DSR projects as 
advocated by [20], [21],  and also addresses the need 
for meals and ingredients rather than recipes as 
expressed by [21]. Furthermore, the use of CR theory 
other than prescriptive theory can be generated, 
which would make DSR more applicable to 
management research as stated by [20].  
CR regards non-occurrences as interesting as 
expected outcomes of events [26]. Outcomes of DSR 
projects that turn out to be unusable or that are used 
in a fashion that differs completely from what was 
intended at the start, are thereby considered as 
important for knowledge generation as successful 
outcomes. Other researchers in DSR (e.g. [11], [12]) 
have also brought up the need to investigate 
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unintentional effects of DSR artifacts, but the 
wording implies that they are less important than the 
main (intended) effects. Following CR, this article 
argues that the understanding of the problem is as 
important as solving it in regards to learning and 
knowledge production. Therefore, knowledge can be 
produced regardless of the utility of the artifact.   
The idea of adopting a CR philosophy when 
doing design science research is not completely new. 
In regards to the ideas put forward by [4]–[6]—that 
CR and DSR have similarities and can benefit each 
other—I agree. This paper does, however, differ in 
scope and area since [4]–[6] focus on DSR and CR 
on a philosophical level and do not mention DSR 
methods. Furthermore, the authors [4]–[6] do not 
consider evaluation in DSR, and the focus is mainly 
on organizational identity and management, although 
the critical and emancipatory element in CR is 
pointed out. In [15] as well as in [4]–[6] it is noted 
that CR contains critical and emancipatory elements 
and that they are important, but the focus remains 
solidly on the management and profit (utility) 
perspective, while the critical issues are left for future 
exploration and development.  This paper argues that 
a retrospective guided by CR provides the 
opportunity to focus a DSR project on goals separate 
from utility. Examples are; goals discussing ethical 
issues, facilitating participation, transparency and 
collaboration (i.e. open government issues) or 
understand and explain organizational phenomena. 
Thereby the benefits of the critical and emancipatory 
element of CR for DSR are highlighted.  
The theory-generating DSR method suggested by 
[12] is close to introducing a retrospective in the form 
of an extended theory generation phase. The problem 
of mixing utility with knowledge generation, as 
pointed out in this research, is not as prominent in the 
theory-driven type of DSR, for instance [11], [12].  
An explicit recognition that knowledge production 
might be possible, although the designed ensemble 
artifact did not address the class of problem identified 
is, however, still missing in [11]. The evaluation part 
of [12] is also still means-end-oriented. It is clear that 
the main objective of evaluation remains, “proving or 
disproving the design theory and/or the utility of the 
DSR artifacts” [35, p. 81]. Thereby, the CR-guided 
retrospective evaluation could potentially be applied 
to complement the action design method proposed by 
[11]  and the theory-generating DSR method 
suggested by [12]. The knowledge creation process 
could thereby be enhanced to include an explanation 
of underlying mechanisms and the inclusion of, for 
instance, ethical perspectives. It would also allow 
failures in the artifact outcomes without diminishing 
the knowledge outcomes.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This article re-evaluates the outcomes of two 
different design science research projects and argues 
that there are several weaknesses in the present 
evaluation methods of design science research, 
especially regarding the outcome of design science 
research as socio-technical artifacts. As a solution, 
critical realism is proposed as a philosophical ground 
to improve design science evaluation in the form of a 
stand-alone retrospective.  
The main contribution of this work is to 
complement existing DSR methods with a 
philosophically grounded retrospective that can be 
used to improve both the knowledge creation and the 
research process. The choice of CR as guiding 
philosophy for the retrospective is considered 
beneficial since it enhances the reach of DSR by 
providing a value-aware evaluation that is not limited 
to means-end-oriented research, but focuses on the 
knowing through making aspect of DSR. Thereby, 
CR guided DSR retrospectives recognize 
organizations’ obligations towards local and global 
societies, people outside the organizations 
(customers, citizens, etc.) as co-creators of value, and 
the duality of information systems to both co-create 
and co-destruct value simultaneously [58]. 
A possible weakness of critical realism is that as 
argued by [8], CR only operates by retroduction, 
which implies that events must have happened in 
order to be understood and explained. Thereby 
retrospective evaluations could require longitudinal 
studies that might be difficult to carry out. I would, 
however, argue that this should not be regarded as a 
weakness, but instead as support for an iterative and 
agile design science methodology. Therefore, short-
term projects can also deliver designs that can be 
evaluated in a real setting and then improved in steps 
in conjunction with a better understanding of the 
problem space. Retrospectives can then be performed 
after each iterative cycle and not only after the 
completion of a step-wise DSR process. Thus, the 
suggested approach is more appropriate to DSR 
methods such as [11]–[13] compared to [1], [2]. 
 
7. Future Research 
 
Future research should develop the ideas suggested in 
this paper in order to provide more detailed 
guidelines for how to conduct CR-guided 
retrospectives in DS. One possibility in this work 
would be to depart from the work by [33] on case 
study research guided by CR, and develop the 
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guidelines provided  there to fit retrospective 
evaluation in DSR. Also, a deeper CR-guided 
retrospective on the cases presented here should be of 
interest in order to increase the understanding of how 
to do DSR in e-government as well as to develop 
design theories for e-government.  
The use of agile methodologies in conjunction 
with critical realism also provides a prosperous way 
forward for creating improved design science 
guidelines—something that could also be undertaken 
in future research. Lastly, it would be interesting to 
further investigate inherent contradictions in IS 
artifacts in conjunction with value creation and 
collaboration, and adding critical realism as a 
perspective on existing research in this area.   
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